Shigehiro Serizawa

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University

H-index: 19

Asia-Japan

About Shigehiro Serizawa

Shigehiro Serizawa, With an exceptional h-index of 19 and a recent h-index of 12 (since 2020), a distinguished researcher at Osaka University, specializes in the field of Mechanism Design, Market Design, Social Choice Theory, Auction, Strategy-Proofness.

His recent articles reflect a diverse array of research interests and contributions to the field:

Toward an Understanding of Insincere Bidding in a Vickrey Auction Experiment

Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples

Correction to: The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction

A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems

A characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices for an arbitrary number of agents and objects

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem

Online Appendix for “The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction”

Shigehiro Serizawa Information

University

Position

Institute of Social and Economic Research

Citations(all)

1096

Citations(since 2020)

359

Cited By

876

hIndex(all)

19

hIndex(since 2020)

12

i10Index(all)

24

i10Index(since 2020)

13

Email

University Profile Page

Osaka University

Google Scholar

View Google Scholar Profile

Shigehiro Serizawa Skills & Research Interests

Mechanism Design

Market Design

Social Choice Theory

Auction

Strategy-Proofness

Top articles of Shigehiro Serizawa

Title

Journal

Author(s)

Publication Date

Toward an Understanding of Insincere Bidding in a Vickrey Auction Experiment

Shigehiro Serizawa

Natsumi Shimada

Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse

2024/2/16

Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

Social Choice and Welfare

R Sakai

S Serizawa

2023

Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples

Games and Economic Behavior

Yu Zhou

Shigehiro Serizawa

2023/7/1

Correction to: The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction

Experimental Economics

Takehito Masuda

Ryo Mikami

Toyotaka Sakai

Shigehiro Serizawa

Takuma Wakayama

2023/3/1

A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems

International Journal of Economic Theory

Yu Zhou

Youngsub Chun

Shigehiro Serizawa

2022/3

A characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices for an arbitrary number of agents and objects

ISER DP

Yuya Wakabayashi

Ryosuke Sakai

Shigehiro Serizawa

2022/2/7

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem

Available at SSRN 4176908

Shurojit Chatterji

Jordi Massó

Shigehiro Serizawa

2022

Online Appendix for “The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction”

Takehito Masuda

Ryo Mikami

Toyotaka Sakai

Shigehiro Serizawa

Takuma Wakayama

2021/5/24

A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule in object allocation problem for an arbitrary number of objects

ISER DP

Ryosuke Sakai

Shigehiro Serizawa

2021/6/2

Mechanism design without quasilinearity

Theoretical Economics

Tomoya Kazumura

Debasis Mishra

Shigehiro Serizawa

2020/5

Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation with money:(Non) decreasing marginal valuations without quasi-linearity

Hiroki Shinozaki

Tomoya Kazumura

Shigehiro Serizawa

2020

Manipulability of efficient allocation rules on rich non-quasi-linear domains

Hiroki Shinozaki

Tomoya Kazumura

Shigehiro Serizawa

2020/10/4

Multi-unit object allocation problems with money for (non) decreasing incremental valuations: Impossibility and characterization theorems

ISER DP

Hiroki Shinozaki

Tomoya Kazumura

Shigehiro Serizawa

2020/8/11

Serial Vickrey Mechanism

ISER DP

Yu Zhou

Shigehiro Serizawa

2020/7/30

Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

Journal of Economic Theory

Tomoya Kazumura

Debasis Mishra

Shigehiro Serizawa

2020/7/1

See List of Professors in Shigehiro Serizawa University(Osaka University)

Co-Authors

H-index: 43
Soo Hong Chew

Soo Hong Chew

National University of Singapore

H-index: 34
Itai Ashlagi

Itai Ashlagi

Stanford University

H-index: 23
Jordi Massó

Jordi Massó

Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona

H-index: 21
Debasis Mishra

Debasis Mishra

Indian Statistical Institute

H-index: 18
Toyotaka Sakai

Toyotaka Sakai

Keio University

H-index: 15
shurojit chatterji

shurojit chatterji

Singapore Management University

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