Itai Ashlagi

Itai Ashlagi

Stanford University

H-index: 34

North America-United States

About Itai Ashlagi

Itai Ashlagi, With an exceptional h-index of 34 and a recent h-index of 26 (since 2020), a distinguished researcher at Stanford University, specializes in the field of market design, game theory, matching, matching theory, matching markets.

His recent articles reflect a diverse array of research interests and contributions to the field:

Optimal allocation via waitlists: Simplicity through information design

Simple and approximately optimal contracts for payment for ecosystem services

On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules

Sequential mechanisms with ex post individual rationality

On the optimality of greedy policies in dynamic matching

Matching in dynamic imbalanced markets

Rank-heterogeneous preference models for school choice

Kidney Exchange

Itai Ashlagi Information

University

Position

___

Citations(all)

3646

Citations(since 2020)

1988

Cited By

2677

hIndex(all)

34

hIndex(since 2020)

26

i10Index(all)

57

i10Index(since 2020)

46

Email

University Profile Page

Google Scholar

Itai Ashlagi Skills & Research Interests

market design

game theory

matching

matching theory

matching markets

Top articles of Itai Ashlagi

Title

Journal

Author(s)

Publication Date

Optimal allocation via waitlists: Simplicity through information design

Review of Economic Studies

Itai Ashlagi

Faidra Monachou

Afshin Nikzad

2024/2/7

Simple and approximately optimal contracts for payment for ecosystem services

Management Science

Wanyi Dai Li

Itai Ashlagi

Irene Lo

2023/12

On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules

Theoretical Economics

Maxwell Allman

Itai Ashlagi

Afshin Nikzad

2023/5

Sequential mechanisms with ex post individual rationality

Operations Research

Itai Ashlagi

Constantinos Daskalakis

Nima Haghpanah

2023/1

On the optimality of greedy policies in dynamic matching

Operations Research

Süleyman Kerimov

Itai Ashlagi

Itai Gurvich

2023/9/12

Matching in dynamic imbalanced markets

The Review of Economic Studies

Itai Ashlagi

Afshin Nikzad

Philipp Strack

2023/5/1

Rank-heterogeneous preference models for school choice

Amel Awadelkarim

Arjun Seshadri

Itai Ashlagi

Irene Lo

Johan Ugander

2023/8/6

Kidney Exchange

Online and Matching-Based Market Design

Itai Ashlagi

2023/4/30

Dynamic matching: Characterizing and achieving constant regret

Management Science

Süleyman Kerimov

Itai Ashlagi

Itai Gurvich

2023/6/7

Early vs single match in the transition to residency: analysis using NRMP data from 2014 to 2021

Journal of Graduate Medical Education

Itai Ashlagi

Ephy Love

Jason I Reminick

Alvin E Roth

2023/4/1

Interviewing Matching in Random Markets

arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.11350

Maxwell Allman

Itai Ashlagi

2023/5/18

Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets

arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.08599

Itai Ashlagi

Mark Braverman

Geng Zhao

2023/2/16

423.9: The First 52 Global Kidney Exchange Transplants: Overcoming Multiple Barriers to Transplantation

Transplantation

Michael Rees

Alvin E Roth

Ignazio Marino

Kimberly Krawiak

Susan Rees

...

2022/9/1

Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets

Operations Research

Itai Ashlagi

Anilesh K Krishnaswamy

Rahul Makhijani

Daniela Saban

Kirankumar Shiragur

2022/9

Price Discovery in Waiting Lists

Available at SSRN 4192003

Itai Ashlagi

Jacob Leshno

Pengyu Qian

Amin Saberi

2022/8/23

Designing school choice for diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District

Maxwell Allman

Itai Ashlagi

Irene Lo

Juliette Love

Katherine Mentzer

...

2022/7/12

Counterbalancing learning and strategic incentives in allocation markets

Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems

Jamie Kang

Faidra Monachou

Moran Koren

Itai Ashlagi

2021/12/6

Optimal dynamic allocation: Simplicity through information design

Itai Ashlagi

Faidra Monachou

Afshin Nikzad

2021/7/18

Explaining a potential interview match for graduate medical education

Journal of Graduate Medical Education

Irene Wapnir

Itai Ashlagi

Alvin E Roth

Erling Skancke

Akhil Vohra

...

2021/12/1

Equilibrium allocations under alternative waitlist designs: Evidence from deceased donor kidneys

Econometrica

Nikhil Agarwal

Itai Ashlagi

Michael A Rees

Paulo Somaini

Daniel Waldinger

2021/1

See List of Professors in Itai Ashlagi University(Stanford University)

Co-Authors

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