Vijay Vazirani

Vijay Vazirani

University of California, Irvine

H-index: 58

North America-United States

About Vijay Vazirani

Vijay Vazirani, With an exceptional h-index of 58 and a recent h-index of 31 (since 2020), a distinguished researcher at University of California, Irvine, specializes in the field of Algorithms, Complexity Theory, Theory of Computing.

His recent articles reflect a diverse array of research interests and contributions to the field:

The Flow Game: Leximin and Leximax Core Imputations

The Assignment Game: New Mechanisms for Equitable Core Imputations

Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability

A Nash-Bargaining-Based Mechanism for One-Sided Matching Markets with Endowments and Dichotomous Utilities

Matching markets with transfers and salaries

Online and matching-based market design

A real polynomial for bipartite graph minimum weight perfect matchings

A Structural and Algorithmic Study of Stable Matching Lattices of Multiple Instances

Vijay Vazirani Information

University

Position

Distinguished Professor Dept. of Computer Science .

Citations(all)

29531

Citations(since 2020)

7850

Cited By

24967

hIndex(all)

58

hIndex(since 2020)

31

i10Index(all)

131

i10Index(since 2020)

72

Email

University Profile Page

University of California, Irvine

Google Scholar

View Google Scholar Profile

Vijay Vazirani Skills & Research Interests

Algorithms

Complexity Theory

Theory of Computing

Top articles of Vijay Vazirani

Title

Journal

Author(s)

Publication Date

The Flow Game: Leximin and Leximax Core Imputations

arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.06037

Rohith R Gangam

Naveen Garg

Parnian Shahkar

Vijay V Vazirani

2024/3/9

The Assignment Game: New Mechanisms for Equitable Core Imputations

arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.11437

Vijay V Vazirani

2024/2/18

Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability

arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.08851

Thorben Troebst

Vijay V Vazirani

2024/2/13

A Nash-Bargaining-Based Mechanism for One-Sided Matching Markets with Endowments and Dichotomous Utilities

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Jugal Garg

Thorben Tröbst

Vijay V Vazirani

2023

Matching markets with transfers and salaries

Online and matching-based market design

Federico Echenique

Nicole Immorlica

Vijay V Vazirani

2023/4/30

Online and matching-based market design

Alvin E Roth

2023/6/22

A real polynomial for bipartite graph minimum weight perfect matchings

Information Processing Letters

Thorben Tröbst

Vijay V Vazirani

2023/1/1

A Structural and Algorithmic Study of Stable Matching Lattices of Multiple Instances

arXiv preprint arXiv:2304.02590

Rohith Reddy Gangam

Tung Mai

Nitya Raju

Vijay V Vazirani

2023/4/5

Pseudomarkets

Marek Pycia

Federico Echenique

Nicole Immorlica

Vijay V Vazirani

2023/5

LP-duality theory and the cores of games

arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.07627

Vijay V Vazirani

2023/2/15

4.4 Normative Desiderata

Online and Matching-Based Market Design

FEDERICO ECHENIQUE

NICOLE IMMORLICA

VIJAY V VAZIRANI

2023/4/30

The investment management game: Extending the scope of the notion of core

arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.00608

Vijay V Vazirani

2023/2/1

2.8 Exercises

Online and Matching-Based Market Design

FEDERICO ECHENIQUE

NICOLE IMMORLICA

VIJAY V VAZIRANI

2023/4/30

Exploration and persuasion

Aleksandrs Slivkins

F Echenique

N Immorlica

VV Vazirani

2023

We wish to study all four aspects stated for this setting. However, it would be quite unwise and needlessly cumbersome to study the aspects directly in this setting. It turns …

Online and Matching-Based Market Design

FEDERICO ECHENIQUE

NICOLE IMMORLICA

VIJAY V VAZIRANI

2023/4/30

Two-Sided Matching Markets: Impossibility Results on Existence of Efficient and Envy Free Solutions

arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.16807

Thorben Tröbst

Vijay V Vazirani

2023/10/25

Structural estimation of matching markets with transferable utility

Online and Matching-Based Market Design

Alfred Galichon

Bernard Salanié

F Echenique

N Immorlica

VV Vazirani

2022

One-sided matching markets

Federico Echenique

Nicole Immorlica

Vijay V Vazirani

2022

Online Bipartite Matching and Adwords (Invited Talk)

Vijay V Vazirani

2022

Cores of Games via Total Dual Integrality, with Applications to Perfect Graphs and Polymatroids

arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.04903

Vijay V Vazirani

2022/9/11

See List of Professors in Vijay Vazirani University(University of California, Irvine)

Co-Authors

H-index: 131
Christos H PAPADIMITRIOU

Christos H PAPADIMITRIOU

Columbia University in the City of New York

H-index: 94
Mihalis Yannakakis

Mihalis Yannakakis

Columbia University in the City of New York

H-index: 84
Nick Feamster

Nick Feamster

University of Chicago

H-index: 71
Eva Tardos

Eva Tardos

Cornell University

H-index: 57
Amin Saberi

Amin Saberi

Stanford University

H-index: 56
samir khuller

samir khuller

North Western University

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