MUSTAFA OGUZ AFACAN
Sabanci Üniversitesi
H-index: 10
Asia-Turkey
Top articles of MUSTAFA OGUZ AFACAN
Title | Journal | Author(s) | Publication Date |
|---|---|---|---|
Rawlsian Matching | Mathematical Social Sciences | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan Umut Dur | 2024/4/17 |
Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf | Journal of Mathematical Economics | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan Gaoji Hu Jiangtao Li | 2024/3/1 |
Seat Allocation Problem in Public Transportation | Mustafa Oguz Afacan Ayse Dur Umut Dur | 2023/12/31 | |
A characterization of Top Trading Cycles under trading networks | Economics Letters | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan | 2023/12/1 |
Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism | Theory and Decision | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan | 2023/10 |
Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible? | The Scandinavian Journal of Economics | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan Umut Dur | 2023/4 |
Assignment maximization | Journal of Public Economic Theory | Mustafa Oguz Afacan Inácio Bó Bertan Turhan | 2022/6 |
Waitlist Engineering in Object Allocations | Available at SSRN 4068728 | Mustafa Oguz Afacan Eray Cumbul | 2022/3/28 |
Strategy-proof popular mechanisms | Journal of Mathematical Economics | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan Inácio Bó | 2022/10/1 |
Arbiter assignment | Mustafa Oguz Afacan Nejat Anbarci Ozgur Kibris | 2022/3/11 | |
Parallel markets in school choice | Games and Economic Behavior | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan Piotr Evdokimov Rustamdjan Hakimov Bertan Turhan | 2022/5/1 |
College admissions with tuition transfers | Games and Economic Behavior | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan | 2022/3/1 |
Improving the Deferred Acceptance with Minimal Compromise | arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.00032 | Mustafa Oguz Afacan Umut Dur A Arda Gitmez Özgür Yılmaz | 2022/4/29 |
Matching with contracts under status quo | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan | 2022 | |
Planes, Trains, and Buses: Seat Allocation Problem | Mustafa Oguz Afacan Ayse Dur Umut Dur | 2022/4/5 | |
Two-Stage Assignments with the Outside Alternative | Available at SSRN 4068725 | Mustafa Oguz Afacan | 2022/3/28 |
Popular Mechanisms | Available at SSRN 3577040 | Mustafa Oguz Afacan Inácio Bó | 2020/6/18 |
Graduate admission with financial support | Journal of Mathematical Economics | Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan | 2020/3/1 |
It turns out that a mechanism is constrained stable and strategy-proof if and only if it is DA (Theorem 1). The “if” statement follows immediately from the fact that DA outputs … | Soc. Choice Welf | Mustafa Oguz Afacan Umut Mert Dur | 2020 |
Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets | Social Choice and Welfare | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan Umut Mert Dur | 2020/10 |
